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ing that it possessed a valid city license to operate cabs bearing such a
designation, without the further showing that this descriptive phraseology
had acquired a secondary meaning which entitled it to injunctive relief.
MAURICE S. CULP

TRUSTS
Reservation of Income for Life, Plus Power to Alter,
Amend or Revoke: Trust Not Testamentary
In three cases courts of appeals held that an otherwise effective inter
vivos trust is not rendered testamentary, and therefore invalid unless
executed in conformity with the Wills Act, by the fact that the settlor
reserved the net income for life, plus the power to modify and/or revoke
the trust.1 One of these cases, First Nat'l Bank v. Tenney,2 was appealed
to the Ohio Supreme Court. The appeal, however, was upon another
ground,3 the appellants at this stage having conceded the validity of the
trust. The following comment by the court makes it dear that the concession was wisely made:
This concession is a recognition that the much criticized rule of

has been properly, albeit not too peaceWorthington v. Redkey,'
fully, laid to rest in Ohio. Although it is unfortunate that, in bringing
the law of Ohio into line with that of all the other states, reliance was
placed on the supposed effect of an amendment to the statute of frauds
rather than upon the sounder reasoning of Stone v. Hackett,'
the
interment is nonetheless complete

Court Will Not Remove Member of Stock Voting
Committee Unless Interests Conflict
In Whiting v. Bryant,7 an action was brought to remove the defendant,
Bryant, from a committee whose sole duty was the voting of stock of the
'Krueger v. Central Trust Co., 136 N.E. 2d 121 (Ohio App. 1956); Magoon v.
Cleveland Trust Co., 134 N.E. 2d 879 (Ohio App. 1956); First Nat'l Bank v. Tenney, 137 N.E. 2d 585 (Ohio App. 1955).
2165 Ohio St. 513, 138 N.E.2d 15 (1956). This decision is fully discussed at 8
WEST. REs. L. REv. 222 (1957).
'The issue on appeal is discussed in the section of this Survey on FuTuRE INTERESTS,
supra.

'86 Ohio St. 128, 99 N.E. 211 (1912). An inter vivos trust in which settlor remined only the power of revocation was held invalid.
'78 Mass. 227 (1858).
'First Natl Bank v. Tenney, 165 Ohio St. 513, 515, 138 N.E.2d 15, 17 (1956)
'131 N.E.2d 425 (Ohio App. 1956).
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Austin Company, which stock was held by the corporate defendant-trustee under two inter vivos trusts. The committee was composed of the
defendant, Bryant, and Whiting, who was one of the plaintiffs. Pursuant
to the terms of the trusts, in event the two committeemen could not agree,
the corporate trustee, in conjunction with either of the committeemen,
could resolve how the stock was to be voted.
The plaintiffs claimed that there was a conflict of interests preventing
Bryant from acting without prejudice to the trusts as a member of the
voting committee, because he was also president of the Austin Company.
It was stressed that as president he must act in the best interests of the
company, and that in voting the stock of the trusts, he should serve the
best interests of the trust - whereby the conflict arises. Further, it was
claimed that acts of the defendant in attempting to purchase, or in suggesting that it would be to the best interests of the Austin Company to
purchase the trust-held stock for use in further developing the incentive
plan of the Company, is evidence of a conflict of interests or divided
loyalty.
The court held that there was no conflict by virtue of the fact that
defendant, Bryant, was president of the Company and a member of the
voting committee. Rather, the interest of one was the same as the other
-to
see to it that the company was well managed. As for the defendant's suggestion that the Company should purchase such stock, the court
noted that this bore no relationship to his duties as a member of the voting committee since only the corporate trustee could sell the stock held
in the trusts. Also, there was no evidence of bad faith on the part of the
defendant.
The court recognized that the removal of a trustee is a drastic action
which should only be taken when the estate is actually endangered and
intervention is necessary to save trust property. In the case at hand, it
was therefore concluded that the power of the defendant over the trust
property was so far removed from the possibility of doing harm to the
trust property that it would be an abuse of discretion to enter a decree
for his removal.

Charitable Trust: United States Government as Trustee
Edgeter v. Kemper8 involved the construction of a will giving the remainder of testator's property to the United States for a permanent fund,
the interest of the fund to be used"
for the relief of the various tribes
of indigent American Indians.
" The court held that the will created
a valid charitable trust and that: (1) the administration of such a trust
is within the authorized powers of the federal government and the gov6 136 N.E.2d 630 (Ohio Prob. 1955)
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ernment has a right to act as trustee; (2) the principle that the United
States when acting as a trustee cannot be sued without its consent is merely an impediment to enforcement of the cestui's rights, but is no bar to
the creation of a trust; and (3) the United States, as trustee, need not
receive letters of appointment from a state probate court, since the probate court has jurisdiction only over persons, associations or corporations
accountable to the probate court, and the federal government is not within the terms of the statute.9 In every respect - but particularly in thoroughness and clarity - Judge Love's opinion is one of the finest this
writer has ever read!
Charitable Trust: Attorney General Not Necessary
Party in Will Contest
In Spang v. Cleveland Trust Co..,1 it was held that the attorney general is not a necessary party in a will contest, within Ohio Revised Code
section 109.25 which, inter alia, provides: "The attorney general shall be
in all proceedings the object of which is: (1) To
a necessary party
terminate a charitable trust or to distribute its assets to other than chari," since the "object" of a will contest is to determine if
table donees
the document is the last will of the decedent, and not, primarily, to terminate the trust.
Constructive Trust: Jurisdiction of Common Pleas Court
To Impose Trust When Will FraudulentlyProcured
In Jacobsen v. Jacobsen" the Ohio Supreme Court held that where
it is claimed that a purported beneficiary, under an instrument in the
form of a will, secured its execution by forgery; fraudulently procured
waivers of the next of kin of the purported testator for the purpose of
probating such will; procured the probate of it by false testimony of the
witnesses thereto; and had himself appointed executor thereof, the next
of kin of the decedent may maintain a suit in the common pleas court
to have the so-called beneficiary and executor held to be a trustee ex
maleficio for the benefit of the next of kin who would have inherited the
estate in the event of intestacy. The court stated that while the probate
court is given exclusive jurisdiction as to all matters pertaimng directly
to the settlement of estates under Ohio Revised Code section 2101.24,
OmIo REv. CODE § 2109.01.
S134 N.E.2d 586 (Ohio C.P. 1956).
164 Ohio St.413, 131 N.E.2d 833 (1956).
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this does not mean the probate court has exclusive jurisdiction over a
cause of action growing out of fraudulent acts committed against a testator, even though such person may thereafter become the executor of the
estate.
The decision is believed to be sound. To hold otherwise would seem
an unwarranted extension of the probate court's jurisdiction and an unpractical limitation of that of the court of common pleas.

Reserved Power to Modify During Lifetime:
Attempted Modification by Will Ineffective
In Magoon v. Cleveland Trust Co.,12 the settlor created an inter vivos
trust; provided for payment to himself of the entire net income from the
trust for his lifetime, plus the payment of parts of the principal in stated
amounts at various intervals; and reserved the following rights and powers in the following fashion:
No power is reserved to me to revoke the settlement hereby evidenced, either in whole or in part, except that I retain the power to alter
or amend the disposition to be made of the trust estate after my decease, and I hereby provide that any other revocation or amendment of
this instrument shall be only with the consent and approval of the Probate Judge of Cuyahoga County, Ohio, any such revocation or modification to be evidenced by written instrument signed by me, and delivered
to the trustee. To whatever extent this settlement shall be so revoked,
the trustee shall thereupon transfer and deliver to me such part or all
of the property comprising the trust estate as may have been withdrawn
under such revocation, conditioned, however, upon my repaying any
advances made by the trustee, and satisfactorily indemnifying it against
any liabilities incurred by it in the execution of this trust.s

The settlor made one modification during his lifetime. When he
died, his duly probated will contained a clause seemingly effecting another modification of the trust. The issue was whether the settlor had
reserved the power in the trust agreement to make a modification by
will. The court found that he had reserved the right to modify the trust
only during his lifetime upon written notice to the trustee, and that the
terms of the agreement did not authorize a modification by will. After
reading the reservation of powers in the manner set forth above, the
writer can only ask: Anyone for a course in legal drafting?
ROBERT C. BENSING

12

134 N.E. 2d 879 (Ohio App. 1956).

"Id. at 880.

